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WHERE IS MY BODY? 
STANLEY FISH'S LONG GOODBYE TO LAW 
Richard Delgado* 
THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE. By Stanley Fish. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press. 1999. Pp. vi, 
328. $24.95. 
THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 
Stanley Fish,1 author of Doing What Comes Naturally,2 Is There a 
Text in This Class?,3 There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It's a 
Good Thing, Too,4 and other paradigm-shifting books, and who re­
cently left law teaching for a position in university administration,5 has 
written one last volume giving his colleagues in the profession he left 
behind something to think about. In his previous work, Fish, who 
taught English and law at Duke University, addressed central legal is­
sues such as meaning, communication, and textual interpretation, 
challenging such received wisdoms as that every text has a single, de­
terminate meaning, or that a regime of free speech is the best guaran­
tor of truth and democratic government. 
In The Trouble with Principle, the celebrated iconoclast takes on 
another of law's most basic premises, namely, that legal reasoning can 
attain any measure of certainty greater than that with which the rea­
soner began (pp. 3-4, 9-10, 43-45). The structure of most legal dis­
course, Fish writes, is irreducibly rhetorical. Appeals to principle serve 
only as covert argumentative strategies, and persons who begin an ar­
gument by saying, "Let's be fair," or "We must be consistent," are 
merely postponing the moment when they must put their cards on the 
table and tell us the cash value of their current platitudes (p. 3). 
* Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, University of Colorado-Boulder. J.D. 1974, Univer­
sity of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). - Ed. 
1. Dean, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago. 
2. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE 
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989). 
3. STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980). 
4. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD 
THING, TOO (1994). 
5. See Alison Schneider, Stanley Fish, as a College Dean, Makes a Big Splash and Spares 
No Expense, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 4, 2000, at A16. 
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This Review begins by smnmarizing The Trouble with Principle, 
paying particular attention· to passages that· show' Fish at his anti­
foundationalist best - sections on hate speech (pp. 75-150), affirma­
tive action (pp. 4, 20-21 ,  26-33, 310), academic freedom (pp. 34-45), 
and religion (pp. 153-284). Because Fish's prose is elegant but his ar­
gument demanding, I offer a metaphor,designed to help readers un­
derstand Fish's insight.6 I then show that the defect Fish highlights is 
part of a larger disconnection that afflicts legal discourse, looming up 
not only when we discuss affirmative action, hate speech, and other 
controversial public-law issues, but also when we try to fit ordinary 
private-law rules into a coherent system.7 In short, Fish exposes only 
part of a more general self-delusion running throughout our system of 
legal thought. In a concluding section, I recommend a pragmatic, anti­
normative approach, similar to Fish's, but applied more broadly, to 
guard against thuggery operating under the guise of principle. Such an 
approach, tied closely to our deeply held moral convictions, I argue, 
can help us remember to support what we need to support, resist what 
we need to resist, and avoid losing our way, like a proprioceptively 
handicapped patient,8 in the "body of law." 
I. CATCHING A BIG ONE: FISH ON PRINCIPLE 
Consider the controversy that broke out when civil rights activists 
demanded that South Carolina stop flying the Confederate flag over 
its statehouse on the ground that it insults African Americans by gra­
tuitously recalling the evil regime of slavery.9 For their part, a number 
of South Carolina citizens retorted that the flag has nothing to do with 
slavery or white supremacy, but merely symbolizes regional pride and 
tradition.10 They marshaled, in other words, the very same principles 
- respect for history and the feelings of a social group - that blacks 
and their supporters invoked to retire the flag. 
Or, consider the controversy that broke out on January 17, 2000, 
General Robert E. Lee's birthday, when an unknown person set fire to 
a banner of the Confederate general in Richmond, Virginia.11 The 
Sons of Confederate Veterans immediately demanded that the police 
6. See infra Parts II-III. 
7. See infra Part III. 
8. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text (explaining and applying this metaphor). 
9. See David Firestone, South Carolina Votes to Remove Confederate Flag from Dome, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2000, at Al6. 
10. See id. 
11 .  See Craig Timberg, Group Calls Banner Burning a Crime, BOULDER (COLO.) 
DAILY CAMERA, Jan. 19, 2000, at A-3. 
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treat the torching as a hate crime.12 As with the first example, forces 
on either side of the controversy cited the same principle - anti­
bigotry - in support of their position. 
Over the course of sixteen short but tightly woven chapters, 
Stanley Fish documents how paying attention ·to the way language 
works in controversies like these enables us to avoid ensnarement in 
traps of our own - or our adversaries' - making. He shows how ar­
guments from principle almost always conceal, in fact presuppose, 
politics and self-interest. He explains how we can avoid having princi­
ples we hold up on one occasion turned against us on another. 
Consider a widely held principle of ethics: that one should keep 
one's word. In an early passage, Fish mentions an episode from the 
classic western movie The Wild Bunch, which features an outlaw gang 
led by two grizzled veterans, played by William Holden and Ernest 
Borgnine (pp. 1-2). At one point in the movie, the two characters are 
sitting around discussing a one-time comrade-in-arms who has gone 
straight and now rides at the head of a band of railroad enforcement 
officers bent on bringing his former friends to justice. The Borgnine 
character muses that he cannot believe their old friend changed sides 
and wonders why he does not return to the gang, where the stakes are 
higher and the life more exciting. The Holden character reminds 
Borgnine that the turncoat undoubtedly gave his word to the railroad. 
So what? Borgnine replies. It's not giving your word that is important 
- it is whom you give your word to (pp. 1-2). 
The exchange makes plain that Fish sides with the "contextualizer" 
- the Borgnine character. Principles rarely guide us in the abstract; 
only in their use. Always stated at such a high level of generality that a 
speaker can use them to arrive at whatever conclusion he wants, their 
very point, according to Fish, is to make discourse appear inevitable 
and high-minded, when it is the social and political commitments of 
the speaker that allow them to gain any purchase (e.g., pp. 3, 8-10, 44-
45, 1 15-17, 142-46). And, if we had the courage of our convictions, we 
would do away with the overlay of appeals to principle that litter so 
much of legal and social discourse and amount to little more than 
noise.13 
12. Id. As everyone knows, civil rights groups have been urging enactment of hate-crime 
statutes that criminalize burning crosses and other acts that send messages of hate to minor­
ity communities. 
13. Pp. 142-43, 146 (urging that we make decisions "nakedly" - without dressing them 
up in abstractions). To be sure, in other places Fish argues that we are quite unlikely to go 
this far, and so ends up recommending that we argue principles for all they are worth. See 
infra note 39 and accompanying text. Fish's suggestion is typical of anti-foundationalists 
generally, who maintain that foundations, like theories and principles, give us nothing that 
we did not have already, and that we can reason, understand, communicate, and have 
knowledge perfectly well without them. See, e.g. , p. 14 ("(Y]ou are on your own . . .  the re­
sources you need are within you if . . .  anywhere."); Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme 
Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying Elephant, 84 MINN. L. REV. 673, 676 (2000). 
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Part I of Fish's book sets out the case against neutral principles, in­
cluding their inability to appear in any guise "not hostage to [a] parti­
san agenda."14 Imagine that someone says: "Let's be fair." Fine, but 
what kind of fairness? Fairness of equality? Fairness of result? Fair­
ness as merit? Fairness of equal opportunity? Taking into account dis­
advantage? (pp. 2-3). Abstractions like fairness, reasonableness, and 
mutual respect only gain content by proceeding "from the vantage 
point of some currently unexamined assumptions about the way life is 
or should be" (pp. 2-3). When someone begins an argument by in­
voking a principle of some sort, we only learn where he is going a little 
later, when we find out what he means by fairness or equality or due 
process. "[T)hat someone is invoking neutral principles will give you 
no clue as to where he is likely to come out until he actually arrives 
there and reveals his substantive positions" (p . . 8). 
One cannot avoid, then, getting substantive and engaging in 
frankly partisan, ends-based reasoning. Moral commitments are all we 
really know; principles only help "partisan agents to attach an honor­
ific vocabulary to their agendas" (p. 7). Throughout history, some of 
the worst cruelty has been carried out in the name of principle -
eugenics,15 Manifest Destiny,16 converting souls to Catholicism.17 One 
sometimes cannot avoid resorting to principle in making one's point.18 
But one should do so for consciously acknowledged rhetorical reasons 
- to advance one's cause, to provide a judge an excuse for ruling in 
one's favor - while fully aware that one's opponent will be trying to 
do the same thing. 
By the same token, one should be wary of the many ways argu­
ments from principle can serve ignoble ends. For example, Fish notes 
that for conservatives, "the basic move is to tum historically saturated 
situations into [ones] detached from any specific historical circum­
stance and then conclude that a proposed policy either follows 
from this carefully emptied context or is barred by it."19 Thus, when 
14. Pp. 2-3. For Fish, this is their most serious drawback. The next most important is 
that they hide what is really going on; bad things are done in their name. 
15. That is, purification of the human race. See, e.g. , DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME 
OF EUGENICS (1985). 
16. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT 142, 185, 233-80 (1990). 
17. On the Inquisition, see, e.g., id. at 85, 94, 155. On the North American version, see 
JUAN PEREA, RICHARD DELGADO, ANGELA HARRIS & STEPHANIE WILDMAN, RACE AND 
RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 173-78 (2000). 
18. For example, courts often expect lawyers to recite cases (a type of principle) in sup­
port of their position, and in close cases tolerate arguments based on public policy. See infra 
note 41 and accompanying text. 
19. P. 4; see also p. 43 (arguing that the ACLU style of thinking is often parroted by in­
dividuals with definite goals - not free speech "but sales of pornography, maintenance of 
lily-white construction crews, the disadvantaging of minority religions, and so on"). 
1374 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1370 
Justice Brown in Plessy v. Ferguson approved a railroad's "separate 
but equal" law that consigned blacks to certain designated cars, on the 
disingenuous ground that it treated black and white passengers "the 
same," he detached a rule or act from its historical meaning - indeed, 
from any meaning at all.20 Any principle, Fish writes, even that of non­
discrimination, arises in response to historical circumstances. In 1954, 
society came to believe that discrimination is wrong;21 before that, it 
did not. The principle, then, has no inherent meaning; that comes only 
from the substantive issues with which it has been associated. 
Left of center on most (not all) issues, Fish makes many of his 
points in the first part, entitled "Politics All the Way Down," at the 
expense of conservatives. For example, he points out that writers of 
this persuasion are prone to decry current "circumstances," com­
plaining that the country has gone to the dogs, liberals are running the 
campuses, barbarians are at the gates, and they - the right - are the 
brave defenders of value in a wilderness increasingly devoid of it (pp. 
20-21). But at the same time, they insist that Hispanics and blacks 
should rise above "circumstances," unaided by affirmative action or 
special measures aimed at redressing past disadvantage.22 The same 
crowd at one time draws attention to circumstances, and at another 
dismisses their relevance. 
Neutral principles not only provide feeble guidance, they disable 
us from seeing differences that matter, such as those between pornog­
raphy and Michelangelo, between oppression and the relief of it, be­
tween advocacy of racial reform and Nazis marching in Skokie.23 
("Nazism is an idea, after all, is it not?"). After Brown v. Board of 
Education24 was decided, Herbert Wechsler wondered whether the 
case was principled, since it seemed arbitrarily to trade the right of 
blacks to associate. with whites for the right of whites not to associate 
with blacks (p. 26). But equations like that one, Fish writes, empty de­
sires of any historical content and equalize them when they are far 
from morally equivalent (pp. 26-27). For example, a legal test that asks 
whether a measure displays race-consciousness and, if so, mechani­
cally strikes it down, "displaces history and morality."25 One that helps 
20. P. 4; see also pp. 5-15 (questioning whether any policy can treat fairly and equally 
groups with radically different histories and current situations). 
21. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); pp. 4-7. 
22. Pp. 29-33. 
23. Pp. 21-27. That is, principles do not enable us to do what their proponents argue 
they can: adjudicate impartially among competing views, desires, and interest groups. Pp. 21-
26. 
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
25. Pp. 26-28. "This is the trouble with principles determined to be neutral: they operate 
by sacrificing 'everything people care about to their own purity." P. 28. By investing too 
much in these meaningless concepts - meaningless save any association they have with po-
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a disadvantaged group advance is a radically different one from one 
that allows white males to sue to stop them.26 Neutral principles do not 
tell us this - they cannot - but morality and history do.27 In a re­
markable tour de force, Fish concludes an early chapter by critiquing 
nine arguments, each impeccably principled, against affirmative ac­
tion, showing that each collapses on examination, revealing the pov­
erty and churlishness in the hearts of those who deploy them (pp. 29-
33). 
Sections on multiculturalism (Chapter Four), hate speech (Chapter 
Five), affirmative action (Chapter One), academic politics (Chapter 
Two), and the Western canon (Chapter Three) drive home that 
"[l]iberal neutrality does political work so well because it has assumed 
the mantle of being above politic[s]" (p. 44), so that "if you don't like 
the political work it is doing, you must labor to take the mantle away, 
strip off the veneer of principle so that policies that wear the mask of 
principle will be forced to identify themselves for what they are and 
what they are not" (p. 44). Affirmative action, for example, is good or 
bad, not because it violates or legitimates some principle. Reasonable 
arguments may be made about it - Does it work? Does it stigmatize 
its intended beneficiaries? - but these are the right ones to ask. 
"[T]he debate is always between competing structures of exclusion" 
(p. 44). Principles and abstractions have no independent moral force 
"except as the rhetorical accompaniments of practices in search of 
good public relations" (p. 45). Fish cautions his readers to beware of 
moments when one's opponents "have a public relations machine so 
good that it's killing you, for then you're going to have to stop and try 
to take it apart" (p. 45). 
But Fish is not only hard on conservatives. In the middle sections 
of his book, he examines some items of faith dear to the left, including 
multiculturalism, whose advocates, according to Fish, are rarely pre­
pared to follow it to its logical conclusion. They quickly pull back 
when one of the cultures they have been defending engages in some­
thing they consider barbaric (such as female genital surgery or fatwahs 
sitions that they have previously been connected with - we become bogged down, tricked 
into inaction and complacency. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
26. Pp. 26-28, 79-82, 287. By allowing ourselves to be led off into a search for something 
other than our substantive convictions, by claiming to rely on a higher force, we suffer a 
"forced inability to make distinctions that would be perfectly clear to any well-informed 
teenager." P. 43 (going on to cite as an example the difference between a lynching and a mi­
nority set-aside). 
27. Pp. 3, 4-7, 9, 12-14, 146, 242, 287, 293. When an argument is framed in a way that 
"labels itself a higher morality [it ends up being] so high that, from its lofty perspective, we 
are unable to see either the forest or the trees." P. 29; see also p. 14 (equating morality with 
taking a stand). 
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aimed at writers who challenge religious orthodoxy) or begin denying 
the legitimacy of other cultures or religions.28 
Chapter Five, entitled "The Rhetoric of Regret,"29 skewers a sec­
ond liberal platitude, free speech, which Fish considers yet another 
perverse manifestation of proceduralism. The American Civil Liber­
ties Union, for example, imagines itself bravely standing up for Nazis 
and other unpopular speakers, and rising above mere preference (pp. 
78-79). Society is supposed to be even-handed as among speakers, pre­
ferring none and disadvantaging none, not even ones voicing ideas we 
justly despise (pp. 76-79). But as later chapters point out, every speech 
act discriminates against ones left unsaid; every utterance aims at kill­
ing another, countervailing one. That is what speech does; its very 
conditions entail selection among points of view (pp. 93-94, 98, 122-
24 ) . The idea of a perfectly free marketplace of ideas in which un­
committed observers dispassionately sample and choose ideas, some­
what in the manner of a diner selecting from a restaurant menu, is 
conceptual nonsense. 
The notion of pre-normative tolerance is not only impossible, the 
argument that it is the cornerstone of Western democracy is demon­
strably false. The United States fought World War II not because 
Nazis were intolerant of free speech, but of Jews (pp. 83-85). If any­
thing, "[I]t is the habit of framing everything in terms of principle that 
makes people confused about what they really want and renders them 
vulnerable to certain argumentative ploys" (pp. 88, 20-21). Speech is 
always coercive. "You go to the trouble of asserting X because some 
other persons have been asserting Y" (p. 93). One speaks not to en­
courage others to speak but to change something in the world, to bind 
others to one's point of view (p. 93). All speech is action; all free 
speech defenders (even self-professed absolutists) admit exceptions 
corresponding to that which they politically detest (p. 94). 
The way to resolve most speech controversies is to consider one's 
substantive commitments and apply ordinary common sense. For ex-
28. Pp. 56-59. This superficial, or "boutique," multiculturalism illustrates the shallow­
ness of reducing everything to an abstract notion of individual rights. A boutique multicul­
turalist respects another culture and takes an interest in it until he or she gets to the core or 
substance of it. The multiculturalist does not embrace the substance of the religion, the part 
those who follow it feel most strongly about, particularly if the religion denies the legitimacy 
of other religions. This is so because the multiculturalist is caught up, not in human rights, 
but in the capacity to exercise those rights. Fish further explores this problem in his discus­
sion of academic freedom: "What you are is your capacity for speech, belief, and choice and 
not what is believed and spoken and chosen, then you are obligated, as a mark of self respect 
- since you define yourself by general capacities that belong equally to everyone - to re­
spect the beliefs, utterances, and choices of others." This focus on capacity rather than sub­
stance renders one, "morally thin." P. 41. In the end, multiculturalism turns out to be "an 
incoherent concept that cannot be meaningfully affirmed or rejected." P. 66. 
29. P. 75. The term comes from the ACLU's frequent soulful professions that it detests 
Nazis, pornographers, and utterers of hate speech, but must defend them anyway, for the 
sake of principle. Pp. 78-79. 
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ample, what is the difference between having Marxists or bigots speak 
on campus? Easy - Marxists are educationally useful, bigots are not 
(p. 89). What is the difference between a law prohibiting demonstra­
tors from harassing women seeking abortion counseling and a hunter's 
rights bill that penalizes animal rights activists who approach hunters 
with picket signs? Also easy - history discloses no great need to pro­
tect hunters, but more than one thousand acts of violence at abortion 
clinics made a protective bill for women going there necessary (p. 89). 
What is the difference between early civil rights bills and recent race­
conscious efforts to ease college admissions for blacks and Hispanics? 
Nothing - the early bills were aimed not at producing a colorblind 
society but at improving conditions for blacks, just as the current 
measures are.30 
Who is to decide speech controversies - judges, college presi­
dents? Where does one draw the line? Sometimes the consequences of 
not drawing the line are intolerable (pp. 91-92). As an example of a 
case where the judiciary backed away from an opportunity to draw a 
clear normative line, Fish gives the case of Skokie. Other examples 
might be hate speech, pornography, and violent TV programming 
aimed at young children. "[R]egulation [which draws lines] is a consti­
tutive feature of social life, not a deformation of it" (p. 127). Speech 
and censorship are inseparable. In the final pages of Part II, Fish turns 
to the work of First Amendment theorists such as Robert Post, 
Richard Abel, and Judith Butler, all of whom criticize the legal system 
for invoking medieval formulas and would-be universalisms, but end 
up either not going far enough or shrinking from their own conclu­
sions and embracing some new universalism (pp. 126-42). Fish con­
cludes by urging that we make decisions "nakedly" - by resort to 
substantive visions of what is good and desirable, not from theory 
purporting to have erased substance.31 If one's substantive convictions 
already tell one what to do, why invoke an abstraction? Doing so just 
invites the other side to invoke a countervailing one, so that the rest of 
the conversation is framed in terms of bloodless entities, when the 
situation (in the words of the title of one of Fish's chapters) is "fraught 
with death."32 
30. P. 89. By the law's logic, however, all these groups - Marxists and bigots, hunters 
and abortion providers - stand on the same footing, smashed together by an overarching 
principle, with the result that "in our own history, procedural justice has been contaminated 
by the very value judgments it supposedly brackets." P. 75. 
31. Pp. 67-71, 142-46, 149 (pointing out that many liberals see hate speech as a problem 
of disrespectful communication, when it is in fact an evil to be confronted and extinguished). 
32. Chapter 6 (pp. 93-114) (analyzing the Skokie case and the impossibility of free 
speech). This maneuver often works: "In recent years, liberals have been discombobulated 
when a practice they abhor is defended by invoking the same principle they had themselves 
invoked in order to argue for a position they favor." P. 88. 
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In Part III ("Reasons for the Devout"), Fish, somewhat surpris­
ingly, takes up the cause of religion. Liberal reasoning always fails to 
come to terms with that institution, in part because the devout be­
liever places his values over "fairness,'' "dialog,'' and "tolerance of 
other points of view," principles the liberal relies on to keep every­
thing more or less in line (p. 208-09). For example, liberals would like 
to rein in religiously motivated abortion protesters who hound women 
at clinics (pp. 89, 297). But their arguments fall on deaf ears because 
the protesters consider that they are protecting human life, the highest 
principle of all (pp. 187, 209). Any principle the liberal holds up, such 
as "dialog," or "consideration of other people's point of view," will 
make little impression on the ardent believer, for that is the nature of 
religious belief - to be intolerant of other systems (p. 297). Religion 
is not like a graduate seminar, where every point of view is considered 
on its own merits.33 "[T]here are no reasons you can give to the de­
vout, not because they are the kind of people who don't listen to rea­
son but because the reasons you might give can never be reasons for 
them unless they convert to your faith or you . . .  to theirs" (p. 209). 
In short, religion, like "every discourse, even one filled with words 
like 'fair' and 'impartial,' is an engine of exclusion and therefore a 
means of coercion" (p. 223). The very way we frame controversies -
for example, as viewpoint censorship (in case one is disposed to grant 
funding of some religious group) versus establishment of religion (if 
one is negatively disposed) - determines the outcome (p. 228). "Lib­
eralism's attempt to come to terms with illiberal energies . . .  cannot 
succeed without enacting the illiberalism it opposes" (p. 242). Fish 
finds fault with contemporary writers such as Daniel Conkle (pp. 187-
88), Thomas Nagel (pp. 181-85), Amy Gutmann (pp. 65-70), Kent 
Greenawalt (pp. 211-20), and Steven Smith (pp. 229-33), each of 
whom attempts to come to terms with illiberal energies but ultimately 
ends up reinscribing some version of current practice.34 He then turns 
the usual wisdom on its head and argues that "[i]mmorality [affirma­
tively] resides in the mantras of liberal theory - fairness, impartiality, 
and mutual respect - all devices for painting the world various shades 
of gray" (p. 242) and rendering us confused, ambivalent puppets ready 
for takeover by determined adversaries or faceless bureaucrats.35 
33. Pp. 40, 68, 297; see also p. 185 (positing .that recent writers are guilty of this confu­
sion and, as a result, end up privileging one regime or another under the guise of some fa­
vorite - usually high-sounding - principle). 
34. Or, in short, liberalism - precisely that which strong religions want to topple and 
resist. 
35. Pp. 241-42; see also pp. 2, 43, 103, 310-12. On the critique of normativity as posing 
some of the same dangers, see Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Cri­
tique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991). 
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Beliefs do change, Fish says, not by resort to arguments from prin­
ciple, but by pointing out to the adversary that the consequences of his 
or her belief conflict with something dear to him.36 Fish recounts the 
experience of a devotee of human eugenics who heard a speech by a 
leading white supremacist. Among other things, the speaker railed at 
society's unwillingness to rid itself of misfits such as children born with 
cleft palates (pp. 281-82). The listener, who had a child with cleft pal­
ate of whom he was very fond, immediately reconsidered his position 
- not as a result of any argument from principle, but rather upon 
learning that his fellow travelers espoused something he could not 
support because of something in his.life (pp. 282-83). 
In a final section, entitled "Credo," Fish gives his readers a glim­
mer of what he does believe.37 The list will come as no surprise: 
antiracism, affirmative action, legal protection for the environment 
and for historically disadvantaged groups such as gays and lesbians, 
and toleration for radical or marginalized religions.38 In deciding how 
to advance one's commitments, Fish recommends the approach known 
as pragmatism: decide particular courses of action in light of current 
and historical circumstances, including the probability of success, the 
likelihood of backlash, and the range of options available.39 It is these 
midlevel, local, and historical concerns - the very ones that argu­
ments from principle claim to transcend - . that should guide us.40 
Nothing is wrong with rhetoric and persuasion, Fish says, even in­
cluding arguments from principle, if one thinks these will wound one's 
adversary or give him pause. But in trying to decide, for ourselves, 
what to do, where to throw our weight, we need more compelling ma­
terial than that. 
Thus, although Fish first suggests we abandon principle, he later 
offers this more pragmatic approach (pp. 8, 44-45, 126-42). In the first 
part of the book he suggests fairly explicitly that we jettison principle: 
"What's a liberal to do? My answer is simply: forget about the princi­
ple (and therefore stop being a liberal), which was never what you 
were interested in the first place, and make an argument for the policy 
on policy grounds, that is, on the grounds that you think it is good and 
right" (p. 89). But the use of principle is not only an approved, but a 
necessary move, so that Fish cheerfully acknowledges that his original 
36. Pp. 301, 307-08; see also pp. 282-83. 
37. Part IV (pp. 279-312). He believes that his beliefs rest on no foundation. Pp. 279-80. 
"[B]elief is prior to rationality. " P. 284. 
38. Pp. 285, 291, 310-12; see also pp. 148-49. 
39. Pp. 293-308. 
40. P. 312; see also p. 63 (approving a version of Charles Taylor's "inspired adhoccery ": 
"What [I] mean is that the solutions to particular problems will be found by regarding each 
situation-of-crisis as an opportunity for improvisation and not as an occasion for the applica­
tion of rules and principles . . . .  "). 
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suggestion collapses "in the wake of formalism's failure - the failure 
of the search for neutral principles - everything remains as it was" (p. 
294). Ultimately, then, Fish's solution is to embrace the rhetorical 
value of principle and exploit it for all its worth: "You are free to de­
ploy it (or not) when the occasion suggests it would be good to do 
so . . . .  Since they won't commit you to acting in any particular way, 
you can traffic in them without worrying that some bad residue will be 
left on your skin" (p. 295). Fish comes full circle, yet at the end of our 
journey we are better off: we no longer need to feel the internal con­
flict that ensues from adhering to a certain principle in one situation 
and arguing against it in another. Because we are no longer duped by 
principles - understanding them for what they are and are not -
"[r]hetorics in long, short, and middle versions are already there for 
the quarrying; and what's even better, using them in a moment of need 
commits you to nothing, necessarily, in the next moment. After you 
have gotten from one what you want, you can just put it back on the 
shelf" (p. 296). Fish is offering awareness of the rhetorical power of 
principle as a tool for effectively dealing with conservatives who use 
liberal principles, but "repackaged and put in the service of the very 
agenda [we] once fought" (p. 312). In short, pragmatism. 
"[M]inds [including legal ones] are never open except [with respect 
to] matters of indifference . . . .  "41 Is this cynicism? No, only apt de­
scription. Religion cannot be tolerant - that is a contradiction in 
terms, a little like a veggie burger. Liberalism cannot deal sensibly 
with affirmative action, hate speech, or academic freedom - it ends 
up tying itself in knots.42 Near the end of his book, Fish addresses the 
question many readers might be wondering about, namely, if principle 
offers no safeguard against tyranny and raw power, what does? Fish 
answers that the best weapon we have - aside from our own moral 
convictions and well-honed rhetoric - is a constitutional structure 
that includes separation of powers.43 This structure erects a barrier 
against official oppression, namely a system of "checks and balances" 
that divides government, assures slow change, and discourages spon­
taneous action aimed at hurting small groups or the sorts of "conflicts 
that tore English society apart in the seventeenth century" (p. 301). 
"These virtues [depriving people and state actors of opportunities for 
oppression] are the properties of the system, not of those who live un-
41. P. 289. In law, the question is "what will go " in this case or that - which courses of 
action, which rulings, with be perceived as respectable and familiar ("We've seen this be­
fore"). Lawyers' stock-in-trade is finding and putting forward "something people like us say 
when issues like this come up" - in short precedent. Judging is rhetoric of a certain stylized, 
conventional kind. Pp. 288-89; see also Feldman, supra note 13, at 692 (observing that the 
public needs to believe that judges act on the basis of constitutional principles). 
42. Pp. 63-66, 71, 79, 187. And, if it doesn't, its conservative enemies quickly accomplish 
that through a series of standard moves. 
43. P. 301; see also p. 306 (reiterating role of founding documents). 
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der it. "44 
After a brief excursion into the role of metaphor, this Review ex­
amines whether Fish's faith in constitutional structure as a safeguard 
against tyranny is warranted. 
II. A METAPHOR FOR STANLEY FISH: 
THE BODY OF LAW AS PROPRIOCEPTIVEL Y DERANGED 
Fish's prose style is clean and lucid. But his argument is so intri­
cate, demanding, and, at times, counterintuitive that many readers 
may fail to grasp its full sweep.45 As an aid to the lost (or time­
pressured) reader, consider the metaphor of the legal system as a pro­
prioceptively damaged human body. 
In recent years, legal commentators have called attention to the 
way certain features of legal reasoning resemble patients who suffer a 
type of neurological impairment, namely damage to the body's pro­
prioceptive centers.46 For the reader unfamiliar with it, proprioception 
is the name for the human faculty - a sort of sixth sense - that in­
forms us about our bodily position and location of our limbs in rela­
tion to each other.47 It tells us whether we are standing straight or 
leaning forward, without having to look. Patients who lose this sense, 
through injury or illness, feel disembodied.48 Unable to locate their 
44. P. 306. Fish appears to recognize that deconstruction of principle, even if it makes 
liberals feel better about adhering to one principle for one agenda and abandoning it the 
next, does little for the disenfranchised suffering from, e.g., affirmative action's demise or 
the law's toleration of hate speech. Merely showing that the sources of one's misery lies in 
conservatives' better use of rhetoric is little solace. Thus, Fish recognizes that other safe­
guards are needed and that they may be found, perhaps, in the structure of the Constitution. 
45. Fish himself appears to recognize his own thesis's counterintuitive nature. See 
Stanley Fish, Children and the First Amendment, 29 CONN. L. ·REV. 883, 891 (1997) (noting 
that desires and principles are inversely related, not the way most people think). Desires 
come first and last, and we carefully choose principles in between that will bridge them. In­
stead of following our principles wherever they may lead, we "figure out what [we] think 
should happen and then look around for principles, First Amendment or any other, that will 
help [us] to get there." Id. 
46. E.g. , Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Considera­
tion of Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371, 382 n.50 (1995); Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Recon­
structing MacKinnon: Essentialism, Humanism, Feminism, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S 
STUD. 89, 170 (1996); Lisa Fry, Finding the Body (unpublished, 1997, on file with author). 
Proprioception is used to provide our internal body image - that is, the way (in addition to 
visual stimuli) in which our brain receives information about the position of our body. Pro­
prioceptors are sense organs buried deep in the tissues of muscles, tendons, and joints that 
give rise to the sensations of weight, positions of the body, and the amount of bending in 
various joints. When this system sustains an injury, one literally loses touch with one's body. 
47. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1458-59 (Maureen Barlow Pugh et al. eds., 
27th ed. 1995). 
48. See infra text accompanying notes 50-59. 
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bodies in relation to themselves and to objects in the external world, 
they describe themselves as bodiless or "pithed."49 
In a chapter of his book, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a 
Hat,50 neurosurgeon Oliver Sacks describes a patient named Christina, 
the "disembodied lady."51 Christina, who until that time had been a 
robust, self-assured young woman who worked as a computer pro­
grammer and liked hockey and riding, was admitted to the hospital for 
a gallstone operation,52 On the day of the operation, perhaps as a reac­
tion to routine antibiotic treatment, Christina had a disturbing dream, 
in which she swayed wildly, could not feel the ground underneath her­
self, and kept dropping things because she could hardly feel anything 
in her hands.53 A psychiatrist diagnosed her as suffering from pre­
operative anxiety ("we see it all the time"),54 but later that day 
Christina's dream came true. She found herself unsteady on her feet, 
in danger of toppling over, and could hold nothing in her hands, which 
"wandered" unless she kept an eye on them.55 On testing, her parietal 
lobes turned out to be working, but "had nothing to work with."56 She 
had lost all proprioception and had no muscle, tendon, or neuroskele­
tal sense whatever. Her position sense was entirely gone, never to re­
turn.57 
Christina is condemned to live in an indescribable, unimaginable realm 
- though 'non-realm', and 'nothingness', might be ... better words for 
it. At times she breaks down - not in public, but with me: 'If only I 
could feel!' she cries. 'But I've forgotten what it's like ... I was normal, 
wasn't I? I did move like everyone else?'58 
Sacks took to showing Christina home movies of herself with her chil­
dren, taken just before the onset of her condition, before she became 
"pithed," "disembodied," "a sort of wraith."59 
The plight of the proprioceptively impaired individual is similar to 
the predicament Fish diagnoses in the person who approaches real­
world problems by first asking what principle commands and ends up 
49. See infra text accompanying notes 57-59. 
50. OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT, AND OTHER 
CLINICAL TALES (1985). 
51. Id. at 42-52 (ch. 3, "The Disembodied Lady"). 
52. See id. at 43. 
53. See id. at 43-44. 
54. Id. at 44. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 45. 
57. See id. at 45-52 (describing how she recovered some of her ability to function by 
learning to examine herself closely every few seconds). · 
58. Id. at 50. 
59. Id. at 44, 50, 52. 
May 2001] Where Is My Body? 1383 
paralyzed, disconnected from the very sources of information that 
could tell him or her what to do (pp. 20-21 ,  67-71 ,  88, 142-49, 241-42). 
In some respects, his fate is even worse than that of Christina, who 
only needed to open her eyes to see where her hands were.60 One who 
puts his faith in principle sees an infinitude of hands, with little way of 
telling which are his own. Like a pithed patient, he is doomed to in­
habit a body of law filled with myriad, often contradictory, principles, 
each with a seemingly equal claim to his allegiance and pointing in dif­
ferent directions.61 
When Fish writes that substantive commitments are more impor­
tant than neutral principles, when social scientists point out that high 
scores on the Graduate Record Exam are negatively correlated with 
social empathy,62 and when a recent book documents that higher levels 
of education were inversely related rescue behavior toward Jews dur­
ing the Holocaust,63 he is highlighting different aspects of the same 
60. See id. at 46-49. 
61. See supra notes 30, 32, 34 and accompanying text. Like the patient whose proprio­
ception is compromised, legal thinkers can go through their professional lives slightly (or in 
some cases, greatly) "out of touch," but unable to quite put their fingers on why. Like the 
patient, their sense of self is skewed, their positional senses dictated by principles that, rather 
than being full of meaning and, therefore, providing some semblance of guidance, are liter­
ally empty - waiting to be spewed to fit any agenda, waiting to be filled in the blank to jus­
tify whichever outcome is sought. The contradictory results that Fish cites - restrictions on 
affirmative action, protecting speech that ends up suppressing other voices, the hypocrisy of 
academic freedom, our schizophrenic view of religion - are each a result of this artificial 
guidance system. See Jack M. Balkin, The Court Defers to a Racist Era, N. Y. TIMES, May 17, 
2000, at A23 (noting that the Supreme Court and Congress view much of civil rights legisla­
tion as based on the Interstate Commerce Clause, when a more natural home would be the 
Fourteenth Amendment). Just as Sacks's Christina "consciously or automatically adopted 
and sustained a sort of forced or wilful or histrionic posture to make up for the continuing 
lack of any genuine, natural posture," SACKS, supra note 50, at 48, by relying on a flawed 
guidance system, the legal actor backs into awkward, inauthentic results. 
Who, then, will be the neurologist for our society? We will have to dismantle our rheto­
ric, suggests Fish, and realize that to hide behind principle is like kicking someone under­
neath a glass table - you are fooling no one. When we step away from the constraints of 
principle, we will walk straight again. For example, when we step back from the notion of a 
colorblind Constitution we will recognize that it does make a difference if the active party is 
the KKK or the NAACP. Similarly, when we are free from the clutches of a lofty but empty 
notion of individual rights we will see that a Shakespearean sonnet and hard-core pornogra­
phy are distinct. By recognizing that one cannot have a procedural mechanism that is not 
hostage to judgments of substance, one will no longer be forced to defend speech acts one 
despises, or brush one's values aside for the sake of procedural purity. Pp. 2, 75, 117. 
62. The exam measures ability to reason abstractly, i.e., from principle. This ability often 
correlates incorrectly with social empathy. See Leonard L. Baird, Biographical and Educa­
tional Correlates of Graduate and Professional School Admissions Test Scores, 36 EDUC. & 
PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 415, 417-18 tbl. 1 (1976). The same author found that LSAT 
scores correlate negatively with the ability to relate to others on an individual basis. Id. at 
419. They do, however, correlate positively with a self-oriented, hedonistic personality. See 
ALEXANDER w. ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE 213 (1993). For a discussion of the 
different types of mental ability, see DANIEL GOLEMAN, WORKING WITH EMOTIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE (1998). 
63. SAMUEL P. OLINER & PEARL M. OLINER, THE ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY: 
RESCUERS OF JEWS IN NAZI EUROPE (1988). 
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phenomenon: abstraction and principle cause human beings to behave 
like decerebrates and to display less, rather than more, intelligence in 
ordering their own affairs. 64 "This [then,] is the trouble with princi­
ples . . .  they operate by sacrificing everything people care about to 
their own purity. [They] become[ ] 'an end in itself' that blithely disre­
gard[ ] any other value." 65 
Fish is right about the unreliability of principle and also about 
what we should depend on in our personal lives, instead. But what of 
his suggestion that, with law and politics, we look not to principle, but 
to the structure of our Constitution, including separation of powers, 
for guidance? Unfortunately, that feature turns out to offer no more 
protection than does our current fascination with principle. 
III. DISCONNECT- How OUR SYSTEM OF PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE LAW OPERATES AT CROSS-PURPOSES 
According to Fish, we should abjure principle as a guide to per­
sonal action and look instead to two other sources - our own moral 
commitments, in the personal realm, 66 and the principle of separation 
of powers, which assures that governmental authority is weakened and 
subject to constant checks and balances, including popular will, in the 
political one. 67 Nothing is wrong with relying on one's own substantive 
moral commitments. But with his second prescription, Fish falls into 
the same proceduralist trap he warns against elsewhere. Government 
has even fewer scruples than individual actors do; indeed, the hope 
that it will restrain itself for reasons of morality is probably the most 
classic category mistake of all. 68 Even more than individual actors, 
governments have readily accessible a panoply of principles - sover­
eignty, national interest, free trade, manifest destiny, even human 
rights - to rationalize what they really want to do. 69 
Fish believes that, even if government is inclined to act badly, our 
constitutional principles of limited government, separation of powers, 
and checks and balances, will guard against overreaching (p. 301). But 
consider how readily government can find ways around these limiting 
principles. Congress is supposed to be the only branch of government 
able to declare war.70 Yet, the president is the commander-in-chief of 
64. See Delgado, supra note 35, at 938-59. 
65. P. 28 (quoting Charles Krauthammer); see also Delgado, supra note 35. 
66. Pp. 2, 7-8, 43, 93-114, 242-43, 310-12; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
68. By the term "category mistake, " I mean the practice of attributing meaning or effi­
cacy to a category or thing that cannot have it (e.g., What is the flavor of yellow?). 
69. See, e.g., NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES (Luigi Ricci 
& E.R.P. Vincent transl., Random House, 1950) (1513). 
70. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11. 
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the armed forces.71 Since he is able to deploy troops practically at will, 
it is easy for the president to circumvent Congress's authority; indeed, 
most recent wars have been undeclared.72 
Or, consider the Plenary Power doctrine, under which the judiciary 
declines to review matters having to do with immigration, even ones 
presenting clear-cut equal protection issues,73 or the myriad of related 
doctrines, including abstention,74 mootness,75 and political questions76 
that enable judges to avoid deciding issues. that might require politi­
cally sensitive interference with another branch of government.77 
Well-funded interest groups and corporations are able to ensure 
that all three branches of government favor policies they want ad­
vanced,78 rendering chimerical the hope that any one of them will act 
as a real check against another in an area vitally affecting the interests 
of corporate power or the military. When powerful interest groups 
need immediate action, they increasingly short-circuit the political 
process by financing referenda and initiative campaigns that mobilize 
the public on behalf of tax-cutting, nativist, or antiminority measures.79 
Finally, the very structure of our system of public and private law 
suffers from such a major disjunction, traceable to our founding 
documents, that adroit invocation of a high-sounding principle will 
generally allow one to reach any desired result. This is worth explain­
ing in some detail. 
The large ideas underlying American public law - administrative 
regularity, the equality of all moral agents, one-man one vote, due 
process/dignity of treatment, dialog/free speech - have always stood 
in tension with those that govern private law - free accumulation of 
71. Id., art. II, § 2, cl. 1 .  
72. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 4-7 at  231 (2d ed. 
1988). 
73. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID
. 
A. MARTIN, AND HIROSHI 
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 268-70, 925-85 (4th 
ed. 1998); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). 
74. See TRIBE, supra note 72, §§ 3-22 to -30. 
75. See id. §§ 3-11 .  
76. See id. §§ 3-13, 4-16 at 285. 
77. In the service of conservative ends, the current Court seems quite willing to employ 
principle, such as a newly limited view of the reach of the Commerce Clause, to reign in 
Congress's power to regulate. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 527 U.S. 898 (1997); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
78. See, e.g., JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How 
CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL 
AGENDA (1996); Alexander Wohl, Justice for Rent: The Scandal of Judicial Campaign Fi­
nancing, AM. PROSPECT, May 22, 2000, at 34; Molly Ivins, Secret Donors Can Buy Elections, 
BOULDER (COLO.) DAILY CAMERA, June 13, 2000, at lOA. 
79. See PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S 
FuTURE 139-55, 229-56 (1998), on the way initiative campaigns have transformed California. 
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wealth, liberty of contract, employment at will, stability of expecta­
tions, protection of private property, and the right to leave it all to 
your children, even if they are no good.80 This hybrid, which promises 
radical democracy in our public sphere, and individualistic free market 
capitalism in the private one, today, even more than formerly, is on a 
collision course with itself. Until recently, the public side has always 
managed to counter some of the excesses of aggressive capitalism by 
assuring that at least a few members of the working class would rise 
and assume places in government, academia, and the professions.81 
But now, globalism and the advent of an economy based on com­
puters and information are concentrating capital so rapidly in the 
hands of a small elite that the uneasy truce that allowed the two­
headed system to work is beginning to break down.82 Already the most 
economically stratified society in the industrialized world, the United 
States is increasingly taking on the appearance and structure of an oli­
garchy.83 Moreover, the high costs of political campaigns and TV ads 
guarantee government by the wealthy into the foreseeable future.84 
Formerly, public education served as an avenue of upward mobil­
ity, enabling an occasional poor but bright child to rise. Functioning as 
a conduit between the private sector � the realm of self-interest -
and the public spheres of government, higher education, and the me­
dia, free schooling closed some of the gap between the private and the 
public, enabling a few from the lower economic strata, or their chil­
dren, to move up.85 It allowed us to believe that democracy and capi­
talism were compatible. But now that avenue is narrowing as conser­
vatives realize that today's economy does not need large numbers of 
80. See, e.g. , KARL MARX, ON THE JEWISH QUESTION (Ellis Rivkin ed. & Helen 
Lederer transl., Hebrew Union Coll. - Jewish Inst. Of Religion, 1958) (commenting on this 
paradox). 
81. That is, the gap between the ostensibly egalitarian focus of the public law, and the 
selfish, individualistic thrust of private law, has been justified by the supposed ability of any­
one, regardless of his or her initial economic position, to rise and gain access to the public 
sphere by dint of hard work. See, e.g. , NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST 24-29, 67-78 
(1999); David Broder, Democracy Derailed, SUNDAY DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.), 
Apr. 20, 2000, at El. 
82. See, e.g. , Holly Sklar et al., The Growing Wealth Gap, Z MAG., May 1999, at 47. De­
crying gross inequity as dangerous to democracy, see Jack H. Balkin, The Declaration and 
the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 167 (1999). 
83. See Sklar et al., supra note 82; Holly Sklar, Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? Z 
MAG., Dec. 1999, at 23; Roger C. Altman, Editorial, 'The Fourth World: On a Global Scale, 
Technology Has Created a Huge Gap Between the 'Haves' and the 'Have-Nots,' L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 1999, at Ml. 
84. See Symposium, Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, 43 HOWARD L.J. 1 
(1999); Molly Ivins, Soon the Word 'Politics' Will Mean 'Money,' BOULDER (COLO.) DAILY 
CAMERA, Mar. 8, 2000, at 9A. 
85. See LEMANN, supra note 81, at 24-29, 67-78. 
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unskilled or semiskilled workers.86 What manufacturing that is neces­
sary is done more cheaply by moving factories to the Third World, 
where the cost of labor is lower,87 while public education can be con­
ducted more cheaply by emphasizing tests,88 attacking teachers' un­
ions,89 and offering the illusion of choice through charter schools and 
vouchers.90 
At the same time, Congress has been slow to reform elections, ei­
ther by financing campaigns so that poor but talented candidates have 
a chance of winning,91 or by adopting redistricting or voting changes 
aimed at improving the chances of minority and blue-collar candi­
dates.92 This inattention to school funding and election reform places 
enough barriers in the way of the poor that the chances of an inner­
city child growing up to be president of the United States seem virtu­
ally nil. 
Our public and private systems of law do contain devices to control 
distortions of various types - but generally only within each system. 
Our public law contains strict scrutiny, in which courts examine skep­
tically any restraint on the exercise of a basic (usually political) right, 
such as speech or association93 or the rights of minority groups.94 It 
also prohibits gross political misbehavior such as the bribery of a pub­
lic official,95 while our private law contains other guarantees against 
86. On the loss of industrial jobs and the trend to an economy based on information 
technology and consumer services, see ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: 
PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST-CENTURY CAPITALISM (1991). 
87. On the export of manufacturing jobs, see id. at 171-84. 
88. See LEMANN, supra note 81. On tests in K-12 schools, see Howard Gardner, What 
Do Tests Test?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1998, at A31; Marisa Trevino, Standardized Tests Can 
Be Misleading, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 24, 1999, at 6J. 
89. On the attack on teachers' unions, see, e.g., Richard Lee Colvin, Selling Teachers on 
School Reform, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1999, at Al. 
90. On charter and voucher plans, see Edward B. Fiske & Helen F. Ladd, The Invisible 
Hand as Schoolmaster, AM. PROSPECT, May 22, 2000, at 19. 
91. E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, TWENTIETH CENTURY FuND WORKING GROUP ON 
CAMPAIGN FIN. LITIG., BUCKLEY STOPS HERE (1998); Curtis K. Tao, Note, A Compelling 
Opportunity to Rethink the Flawed Evolution of Contribution Speech, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1345 (1999); see also, supra notes 78, 84. On the recent reaffirmance of Buckley v. Valeo's 
ruling on campaign contributions, see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 381 
(2000) (holding that Buckley "define[s] the scope of permissible state limitations" on politi­
cal contributions). 
92. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of 
the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589 (1993). 
93. E.g. , TRIBE supra note 72,. §§ 16-7 to -12, 16-31 at 1590-93, 16-33 at 1610-13. 
94. Id. §§ 16-13 to -23. 
95. E.g. , JOHN NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984). 
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distortion in such rules as antitrust,96 corporate governance law,97 and 
bankruptcy.98 
Yet no comparable feature protects social mobility, the ability of 
private citizens to gain an education or launch a political campaign. 
Case law deems education not a fundamental right,99 poverty not a 
suspect class;100 moreover, our society has rebelled, until now, at 
funding independent candidates for political office.101 Our system, in 
short, proceeds like a hydra-headed creature, with one head consisting 
of a highly idealized system of public law; another, a less idealized pri­
vate law governing the way we make profits and earn livings, but little 
to mediate between the two.102 Like the patient Christina, our pri­
vate/public law structure is as disconnected and stumbling as any of 
Oliver Sacks's patients.103 Fish's solution - that we look to our legal 
system's broad structure for guarantees against oppression - leads to 
the very blind alley he describes over the course of 368 pages on the 
defects of mainstream legal reasoning. 
It turns out, then, that our predicament is even deeper than Fish 
paints. We cannot rely on separation of powers nor on popular will to 
guard against domination by our own government or by well-financed 
elites. Furthermore, principle will rarely stop a determined adversary. 
We are left, then, with little more than the resources we bring to any 
encounter, primarily our own intuitions, growing out of our life expe­
riences with justice and injustice, and what political alliances we may 
make with like-minded individuals in support of common ends. For 
96. E.g. , LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 
1-2, 5-11, 44-52 (1977) (discussing antitrust doctrines aimed at normalizing economic effi­
ciency and deterring monopolies and price-fixing). 
97. E.g. , HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (3d student ed. 1983) (describing policies against insider 
trading), §§ 239-40, 298. 
98. E.g., DA YID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY (1993) (setting out policies of this 
branch of law, including providing debtors with a fresh start, and creditors an orderly and 
predictable means of collecting amounts due them). 
99. See San Anfonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); TRIBE, supra 
note 72, § 16-4, 16-9; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (applying intermediate stan­
dard of review to Texas scheme that denied access to public education by the children of un­
documented aliens); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999) 
(noting that many inner-city schools are both underfunded and segregated, and that reme­
dial schools must address both conditions simultaneously). 
100. E.g. , Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); TRIBE, supra note 72, § 16-52; 
Randall S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality Rights, 17 
LAW & INEQ. 239 (1999). 
101. See supra notes 78, 
·
84, 90 and accompanying text. 
102. That is to say: That structure is not only poorly adapted to counter official oppres­
sion, it is unlikely to sustain any sort of coherent social program, at least on its own. See su­
pra notes 78-99 and accompanying text. 
103. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text. 
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Fish, as for this writer, to believe that we have more is a dangerous il­
lusion, one that threatens to disconnect us, in an almost neurological 
sense, from the sources of action and belief that really matter. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, Fish simply wants to reveal what principles are not -
not so much to get us to abandon them as to alleviate some of the in­
ternal anxiety that espousing them creates. If we follow his lead, we 
will no longer have to feel "pithed," or disoriented, because of serious 
flaws in our internal compass. We can use rhetoric to our heart's con­
tent and not feel guilty or hypocritical - because there is no other 
way.104 
Yet, a deeper look at the structure of our legal system reveals that 
our quandary is more profound than Fish exposes. A fundamental 
contradiction in our system, which throws our public and private law 
at odds with each other, prevents Fish's solution - to simply exploit 
rhetoric (while keeping aware of its traps) and relying on our constitu­
tional structure to safeguard us - from working. 
In The Trouble with Principle, Stanley Fish reveals only the first 
stages of an illness endemic in our legal system. Because he fails to 
recognize how deep the predicament runs, he offers up a solution that 
cannot be used by a society increasingly mired in self-contradiction. 
Not until we open up avenues for upward mobility or reconcile the 
contradiction between public and private law will we be able to orient 
ourselves in any satisfactory way, or develop defenses against the 
types of deep, structural inequalities that are developing at such a 
frightening pace. 
104. "Figure out what you think is right and then look around for ways [i.e., principles, 
rhetoric] to be true to it." P. 242; see also pp. 7, 67-71, 75, 89, 91-92, 94, 126-46, 149 (same); 
supra notes 15-18, 30-31, 39 (same). 
